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Abstract: The paper critically analyzes the reasons for the protraction and intractability of the Syrian 
civil war despite several concerted efforts to resolve it. The analysis leads to identifying seven 
theories that proffer different explanations each of which addresses an aspect of the problem. The 
explanations are that Syria’s civil war is prolonged and intractable due to the institutional weakness of 
the United Nations and the infighting in the United Nations Security Council; the sectarianization of 
the civil war by Islamist extremist rebel groups; the Syrian opposition’s deployment of violent 
approach instead of sticking to non-violent approach; the Syrian rebels’ abundant profits from Syria’s 
illicit economy; the West’s reluctance to use military action against the Syrian government because 
such action will be unprofitable; internal factors which include the peculiar nature of the dynamics of 
the civil war and the internal politics and institutional power structure of the major internal players in 
the war; and external factors like the obstructive behaviour and activities of external players, 
especially great powers. While these theory-based explanations are important, the paper concludes 
that the last account is most likely the truest reason why the Syrian civil war continues up to now in 
its eighth year. 
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1. Introduction 
There is no doubt that the Syrian civil war is protracted and intractable: it continues 
beyond the expectation of the majority of people and has so far defied all 
diplomatic efforts to end it. This situation has raised the question, “why is the 
Syrian civil war protracted and intractable despite concerted efforts to end it?” The 
question has elicited seven different theory-based explanations which, 
interestingly, provide diverse academic perspectives on one subject-matter.  
The first scholarly explanation based on institutionalism argues that the protraction 
and intractability of the Syrian civil war is caused by the failure of the United 
Nations (UN) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene in 
Syria. This disappointing fact is the consequence of the inability of the UNSC, 
especially its five permanent members, to present a united and cohesive approach 
to resolve the civil war, and the reason for this is because they are engaged in the 
rat race of pursuing conflicting selfish interests instead of helping the Syrian people 
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altruistically. The second explanation anchored on relative deprivation theory states 
that the sectarianization of the civil war by desperate Islamist extremist rebel 
groups is responsible for the prolongation and difficulty in resolving the war 
because these groups of rebels have both entrenched ideology and the 
resourcefulness for re-emergence and remobilization that make them difficult to 
defeat. 
Another explanation founded on non-violence theory is that the substitution of 
violent approach for non-violent approach by the Syrian opposition for the belief 
that violent approach is the proper opposition response to the Syrian government’s 
brutality ended up protracting the civil war and making it intractable. The fourth 
explanation rooted in economic theory of conflict holds that the Syrian rebels’ 
illicit economy makes them undaunted and resilient and, consequently, prolongs 
the civil war and makes it difficult to end. The fifth based on classical deterrence 
theory contends that the Syrian civil war is prolonged and intractable because 
Russia’s strong military presence in Syria, as well as other secondary factors, 
deters the West from launching a military campaign against the Syrian government 
to stop the civil war. The sixth explanation built upon structural conflict theory 
argues that the intricate dynamics of the civil war itself and the internal politics and 
institutional power structure of both the Syrian government and the Syrian 
opposition favour the Syrian government while, at the same time, they divide the 
opposition into pockets of groups, and this makes them unable to defeat the 
government, on the one hand, and difficult to be defeated completely by the 
government, on the other hand. Consequently, the civil war is protracted and 
intractable. The seventh explanation founded on national role theory blames the 
protraction and intractability of the Syrian civil war on external players who are 
pursuing conflicting and selfish national interests in Syria and have refused to set 
aside their differences and interests in order to help the Syrian people unselfishly.  
In the final analysis, the paper takes the position that the most compelling theory-
based explanation for the protraction and intractability of the Syrian civil war is the 
last explanation which, based on national role theory, holds strongly that the 
activities of external players, especially Russia and the United States, in Syria, 
which they consider as expected national role in the civil war albeit pursuing 
selfish interests, constitute the greatest reason why the war is prolonged and 
difficult to stop. This is because the great power external players possess all it takes 
to create the conditions that will ultimately compel both the Syrian government and 
the Syrian rebels to stop fighting even if they would have chosen to continue to 
fight. 
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2. The United Nations is Hindered from Ending the Syrian Civil War 
Institutionalism is a reference point in the attempt to answer the question of why 
the Syrian civil war is protracted and intractable. The theory argues that the 
structure of power and the dynamics of an institution impact on how the institution 
performs its functions as well as on the performance outputs and outcomes of the 
institution. Here, this theory refers to the discouraging activities and behaviour of 
the UN and the UNSC towards the Syrian civil war. Institutional perspectives or 
theories “focus on the [roles,] rules and structures of institutions and show that 
these established routines or patterns have an impact on outcomes” (Baglione, 
2016, p. 64). The UNSC is giving a cosmetic treatment to the Syrian conflict, as 
seen in the resolution to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles which was 
not effectively and comprehensively implemented, and which was not intended to 
end the civil war. The Council has failed alongside other actors, such as the United 
States and Russia, to address the core problems of the civil war, which surround the 
Bashar al-Assad government (Güney, 2013). Whilst the existence of ISIS 
constitutes a huge impediment to efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, the UN 
has failed to stop the conflict. The behaviour of powerful external players hinders 
the UN from successfully negotiating a settlement of the conflict. Since the failure 
of the Geneva III Conference on Syria, held at the behest of the UN, the UN’s role 
in trying to resolve the Syrian civil war has been reduced to merely brokering 
short-lived truces (Ibrahim, 2017).  
The protraction and intractability of the Syrian armed conflict is largely due to the 
exploitation of veto power by the five permanent members of the UNSC. The UN 
has the responsibility of promoting world peace and security, but this function is 
performed through the UNSC. However, due to the conservative and undemocratic 
pattern of organizing power in the UNSC, which confers veto power on five 
permanent members of the Council by virtue of Article 27 of Chapter V of the UN 
Charter, it is difficult for the Council to agree on a resolution to the Syrian conflict 
because each of the permanent members uses veto power selfishly rather than 
altruistically for Syrians. The failure of the UNSC to resolve the Syrian conflict or, 
at least, to sustain negotiated ceasefires underlines the great power politics among 
its five permanent members— Britain, France and the United States versus China 
and Russia. These permanent members of the UNSC are frustrating the UN from 
resolving the armed conflict, by using veto power arbitrarily to seek to push or 
protect some egoistic interests. Hence, diplomatic initiatives sponsored by the UN 
to end the civil war, such as the Kofi Annan’s, Lakhdar Brahimi’s and Staffan de 
Mistura’s peace plans, are abortive because of the reckless use of veto power by 
the countries that wield it (Önügören & Tankr, 2018).  
Similarly, the chances of attaining peaceful resolution of the civil war has been 
impeded due to the futile efforts of the UN to provide a negotiated peaceful 
settlement between the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition through its 
Geneva Peace Talks held under the auspices of UN-Arab League Joint Envoy, Kofi 
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Annan. The futility of the UN’s efforts is the consequence of the adverse 
competition among various internal and external players to make more territorial 
gains over the others so as to be in a better position during negotiation, instead of 
seeking a popular solution to the conflict. This has given rise to numerous rebel 
groups and an adamant Syrian government. While the UN failed to reach a 
common agreement on which groups of the Syrian opposition to invite to the 
Geneva Peace Talks, some opposition groups have been prohibited from 
participation amidst rift between Syrian rebels fighting at home and the exiled 
Syrian opposition figures that lack full control over the rebels at home (Collin, 
2018).  The UN’s effort to reconcile the internal parties to the armed conflict and 
end the war through a negotiated agreement has been futile because members of 
the international community argue over choices of delegates to attend peace talks 
(Habets, 2016). 
In as much as the West is reluctant to use military action in Syria despite calling for 
external military intervention against the Syrian government in order to end Syria’s 
civil war, they blame Russia and China as the obstacle to the resolution of the war 
for vetoing Western diplomatic efforts to get the UNSC to approve external 
military intervention against the Syrian government, which the West sees as the 
only way to implement the multilaterally agreed peace plan proposed by the UN-
Arab League Joint Envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan. Hence, the anti-Western activities 
of Russia and China in the UNSC hinder the Council from using the doctrine of 
“Responsibility to Protect” to sanction external military intervention against the 
Syrian government in order to end the armed conflict in Syria. Particularly, Russia 
is the one accused of preventing the UNSC from intervening in Syria militarily to 
end the country’s civil war, because it tenaciously objects to the enforcement of the 
UN principle of “Responsibility to Protect” in Syria and only gets China to support 
its position (Zifcak, 2012). While Russia and China also support the peace plan for 
Syria, they are both opposed to the use of external military force to implement it 
(“Russia ready to seek consensus”, 2012; Lesch, 2012; Nuruzzaman, 2013). 
Besides the Geneva Peace Talks, the UN-sponsored peace talks held in Vienna 
failed to yield any significant results. Also, Russia’s and China’s anti-Western 
diplomacy and the Syrian government’s continued military offensive and rejection 
of dialogue with the Syrian opposition in certain talks contribute to the incapacity 
of the UN to help Syria with a solution to its civil war (“The UN in Syria”, 2018). 
Generally, the failure of world powers, not just only the five permanent members 
of the UNSC, to end the disagreement over which group(s) or party(ies) to hold 
accountable for the sufferings caused by the Syrian civil war and over how to 
resolve the war, also contributes to the UNSC’s inability to impose sanctions and 
order external military intervention against the Syrian government (Khan, 2012). In 
addition to other circumstances, these factors pose a serious challenge to the UN 
and defy its efforts to help Syria to end its long civil war. 
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3. Sectarianism Makes the Syrian Civil War Protracted  
When the Syrian civil war began on 28 July 2011, it had no sectarian colouration; 
almost all ordinary Syrians jointly protested against the Syrian government. 
However, the eventual sectarianization of the civil war can be explained by relative 
deprivation theory. Relative deprivation theory, a social psychological construct 
relevant to the study of politically significant conflict, is attributed first to Stouffer, 
Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1949) who coined and utilized the 
relative deprivation concept in surveys of American soldiers during World War II 
in which he discovered that members of the US Army Air Corps felt relatively 
deprived due to frustration over problems with promotion in comparison to the US 
Military Police, even though they enjoyed a faster rate of promotion than the 
military police. After him, other scholars contributed to the development of the 
theory: Merton (1957) and Merton and Kitt (1950) applied it to explain reference 
group theory, while Runciman (1966) expanded it by introducing and 
distinguishing between individual/egoistic relative deprivation and group/fraternal 
relative deprivation (Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). Since then, several scholars have 
used the theory as a broad framework to explain the causes of social conflicts so 
that the theory connects with frustration-aggression theory, grievance theory, social 
comparison theory, equity theory, causal attribution theory, etc which also explain 
different kinds of social conflicts.  
The theory, which was introduced into political science by Gurr (1970), 
emphasizes the role of perception of economic inequality in building the 
consciousness of relative deprivation within an identity group or a section of 
people in a larger social setting. Relative deprivation theory, especially the 
fraternal strand of it, argues that when people or a group of people within a larger 
group or community experience(s) a gap or disparity between what they think they 
deserve and what they actually get and are able to connect this fact to a real or 
perceived deprivation or denial of their right to enjoy values that are essential to 
society and humanity—such as power, money, employment, freedoms/rights, 
justice, equality, and other vital socio-economic, civil and political values—
especially when such values are largely distributed through the politics of 
authoritative determination of who gets what, when and how, whereas other people 
or another group of people within the same community enjoy(s) such values and 
are, therefore, better-off politically, socially and/or economically, such people or 
group of people are/is usually given to organizing or joining social movements 
dedicated to cause the government to provide the values of which they feel or are 
actually deprived. In extreme cases, relative deprivation has been implicated as a 
driver of socio-political disorder such as insurrection, militancy and terrorism, as 
well as outright conflicts such as insurgency or civil war where the relatively 
deprived group decides to overthrow their government believed to be the source of 
their deprivation and replace it with another one that will be favourable to them.  
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Relative deprivation theory is viable for explaining identity-based conflicts in 
which a section of society is marginalized politically and economically because of 
their identity, whether religious, ethnocultural, ideological or political, by a 
government dominated by an opposing identity group. In the long run, the likely 
consequences are frustration, pent-up grievances, demonstrations and possible 
aggression against the government.  This theory helps to account for the reason the 
Syrian civil war has assumed a sectarian dimension and become protracted and 
intractable. Syria is an Islamic nation and, like other Islamic countries, has two 
dominant Islamic denominations: Sunni Islam and Shia Islam each of which has 
beliefs that differ greatly from those of the other. Sunni Muslims who constitute the 
majority of Syrians suffer from an entrenched, informal, systematic political 
marginalization and deprivation perpetuated by the Alawite-Shiite dominated 
national government that has held power for many decades, where Syrian Shiite 
Muslims comprise a minority. It is, therefore, logical to see that the Syrian civil 
war —which developed from a Sunni Muslim dominated nation-wide mass protests 
against an Alawite-Shiite dominated national government with whom Sunni groups 
such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had often militantly struggled for power in 
the past—revived the old Sunni acrimony, frustration and pent-up grievances 
against the Bashar al-Assad government and, thus, easily took a sectarian 
dimension in which Syrians identified as Sunnis take the civil war to be the final 
opportunity to end Shiite strong hold over Syria, while Syrian Shiite Muslims and 
other non-Muslim minor identity groups that benefit from the Assad government or 
sympathize with Syrian Shiites that are also a minority see the war as a challenge 
to defend their privileged position, on the other hand.  
Consequently, the sectarian nature of the Syrian civil war has created a conflict 
situation that has become volatile, convoluted and unpredictable so that concerted 
efforts to resolve it are futile. In the light of this, it has been observed that the civil 
war has become rift with several sectarian clashes between Sunni and Shiite, 
including Alawite, Muslims. The sectarianization of the civil war has resulted in an 
angry Sunni-Shiite vendetta, which has triggered sectarian identity-based 
massacres across Syria in the midst of which many Sunni Islamist rebel groups 
such as ISIS and al-Nusra Front gained ascendency over the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) which gradually declined. In this situation, a union of Salafist groups has 
emerged dominant and strong. ISIS and several other rebel groups have strong 
control over vast territories where they govern in effect. ISIS’s extreme violence 
heightens the chaos and ferociousness of the civil war and makes the West frantic 
(Ibrahim, 2017). Another reason the Syrian civil war has turned seriously sectarian 
is because while the international community failed to pressure Bashar al-Assad 
into submission, several members of the community have provided immense 
support to Sunni Syrian rebels based on sectarian consideration. In the sectarian 
complication of the war, Sunni Muslims still believe that massacring confessional 
minorities is instrumental in ousting the government and forming a confessional 
majority government, while the minorities continue to fight against Sunnis, fearing 
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marginalization and harsher vendetta under a Sunni Syrian government. These 
negative extremes of contrary convictions defeat the hopes of a peaceful solution to 
the conflict. Without resolution of these contradictions, the Syrian civil war tends 
to be a frozen war (Outzen, 2014).   
Due to the Sunni-Shia sectarian nature of Syrian society, the old struggle between 
the two sects and the old grievances of Sunni Muslim majority against the 
advantaged Shia and Alawite Muslim minorities who dominate the Bashar al-
Assad government, the Syrian armed conflict rapidly took the form of a Sunni-Shia 
sectarian civil war which attracted the direct and indirect interventions of regional 
State and non-State actors along the same sectarian lines. The sectarian nature of 
the war has resonated once again the bitter regional rivalry chiefly between Sunni 
Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran which are supporting the Syrian opposition and the 
Syrian government respectively alongside pursuing their conflicting geostrategic 
interests. Iran has enormous regional, anti-Western and geostrategic interests that it 
needs to accomplish with the support of the Syrian government. With direct 
involvement in the Syrian civil war, therefore, Iran has shored up the Syrian 
government’s military strength by providing strong military support and 
significantly mobilizing Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon 
through Hezbollah, while Saudi Arabia, alongside other Sunni States, though not 
directly involved in the war, is supporting rebel groups with weapons and funds. 
Like Saudi Arabia, the sufferings of Syrian Sunni Muslims from the onslaught of 
the Shiite-Alawite Syrian government have dragged Turkey—an Islamic State led 
by a Sunni dominated government—into conflict with the Syrian government 
(Rabinovich, 2017).  
As the demographically dominant Sunni Muslims are in the forefront of the 
opposition’s war against the Syrian government, the sectarianization of the Syrian 
civil war creates great anxiety among Syrians. A difficult issue in the civil war is 
that there are too many well-rounded Sunni opposition groups fighting the Syrian 
government for various selfish reasons many of which are conflicting. 
Consequently, it is difficult to aggregate the various interests of these groups or to 
make a good sampling of the opposition’s interests and representatives in peace 
talks. Often times there are conflicting demands and preferences among different 
Sunni sectarian groups and among members of the same Sunni sectarian group. 
The hopes of reaching a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict through 
negotiation are, therefore, slim in that some opposition groups and independent 
armed groups will certainly be discriminated against through exclusion from 
negotiation. Such rejected groups are inclined towards sabotaging the peace 
process and advancing the incentives for a continuous war, seeing that their hopes, 
expectations, goals and interests are doomed, while the groups whose interests are 
favoured would consequently incur hate and dissociation of the unfortunate groups 
(Groarke, 2016). Also, the Geneva II Conference on Syria has failed to formulate 
frameworks to defeat Jihadist rebel forces and to strengthen the unity of the Syrian 
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army—whose Alawite officers have the suspicion that their Sunni colleagues are 
sympathetic to the cause of Sunni Jihadists against whom the Syrian government is 
fighting—for security responsibilities post-Assad. The failure to tackle these two 
issues will make the resolution of the Syrian conflict as well as post-Assad political 
transition impossible (Khatib, 2014). 
The civil war is beyond ordinary revolution. Besides the rigid stance of the Syrian 
government not to stop fighting, the involvement of multiple opposition groups 
gives the war some ethnoreligious character that continues to drive it. The ruling 
class, together with the Alawite community, fears socio-political displacement, 
while several extremist elements of the Sunni-dominated opposition have turned 
the war into a Jihad and posed an existential threat to non-Sunnis. In defence of 
their conflicting interests, these groups are seriously engaged in an existential war 
which may not end even if Bashar al-Assad is overthrown (Sorenson, 2013). 
Moreover, the multifarious ethno-confessional nature of Syria and the cleavages 
such identity groups have formed far into the past reflect in the complex dimension 
the Syrian civil war has taken. The civil war has been a war between the Alawite-
led Syrian government supported mainly by other ethno-confessional minorities, on 
the one hand, and the mostly Sunni-dominated opposition inclusive of Islamic 
extremists and Jihadists, on the other hand. The minorities loosely align against the 
Sunni majority and each side is fighting to avoid defeat for fear of untold revenge 
of the victor against the vanquished. While minorities across all confessions fear 
ethnic cleansing from the Sunni-led opposition and, therefore, fight desperately to 
preserve their lives and communities, the Sunni-led opposition considers the war as 
an opportunity to revenge against the Alawite-led government and depose it, and to 
form a government that will represent their interests without which a victorious 
Alawite-led government will persecute them even more and relegate them to 
perpetual inferiority (Robinson, 2012). 
There is a stalemate between the Syrian government and the Syrian rebels in which 
both sides lack superior resources to defeat the other; while the government lacks 
adequate personnel and as such could not retake all the territories it lost to the 
rebels, the rebels lack both adequate personnel and weapons to advance into 
government-controlled areas, including Damascus, and to overthrow the 
government. The Syrian government has been confident and forceful in 
prosecuting the long Sunni-Alawite/Shiite sectarian war. It hopes to drag the Syrian 
opposition into a war of attrition aimed to annihilate it ultimately (Spyer, 2012). 
Following the Syrian government’s repression of volatile protests—an act which 
started a military confrontation between it and the opposition’s FSA—the Syrian 
civil war has gradually become uncontrollable as Syria has split into pro-
government and anti-government factions, each of which is desirous of fighting to 
zero-sum military victory. Further on the upward spiral course, the Syrian 
opposition has divided into several armed groups, including Islamist groups—such 
as ISIS, al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, Turkey-backed Jaysh al-Islam and 
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Saudi-backed Ahrar al-Sham—fighting the Syrian government and one another. 
Consequently, while the sectarian and ideological dimensions of the civil war lead 
to Sunni-Shia and moderate-fundamentalist confrontation, Iran’s role in the war is 
perceived to increases Sunni-Shia sectarian tension (Habets, 2016). The sectarian 
nature of the civil war enhances terrorism, while Jihadists’ involvement in the war 
further complicates the chances of resolving it, as they are rooted in various ways 
and wont to sabotage peace efforts (Lesch, 2012).   
Despite the fact that the United States clamours for the deposition of Bashar al-
Assad, it is actually hesitant to oust him. Instead, the United States tacitly supports 
the al-Assad government’s fight against Islamist Jihadist groups because such a 
fight serves its anti-Jihad interest (Khatib, 2014). The failure of the UN’s Geneva 
Talks to address the civil war in Syria consequently encouraged the emergence of 
ISIS. Although the United States and Russia entered the civil war to fight ISIS in 
coordination with Syrian rebels and the Syrian government respectively, the 
concerted fight against this Islamist terrorist State has reduced the chances of a 
negotiated resolution because it removed the original cause of the war from the 
spotlight and turned attention to defeating ISIS (Collin, 2018). Nevertheless, ISIS 
and other uncompromising Islamist Jihadist groups have become very active and 
the incomplete annihilation of ISIS further makes resolving the conflict 
impracticable because the terrorist group will revive, regroup and resume fighting 
(Dalton, 2017). Similarly, while the introduction of terrorism into the civil war also 
by some moderate opposition groups’ forces prolongs the war and makes political 
settlement practically impossible (“Russia’s intervention”, 2015), the threat of a 
continuous Islamist terrorism created by the unfinished extermination of ISIS is a 
feature of the armed conflict to bother seriously about (Rabinovich, 2017).  
 
4. By Adopting a Violent Approach, the Syrian Opposition Loses the Hopes of 
Victory and Prolongs the Civil War 
Non-violence theory suffices to explain that the adoption of non-violent approach 
towards violent repression or clampdown by the State is instrumental in gaining 
victory for the repressed group. The essential philosophy of this theory is the 
application of restraint and self-denial in response to conflict and abstaining from 
the use of physical force to achieve an aim or to resist or respond to the violent 
aggression of another party against one. Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King 
are famous for their strong advocacy and practice of non-violent approach to 
conflict with government. Non-violence “refers to methods of political action that 
eschew violence” (Howes, 2013, p. 430). “As an ethical philosophy, it upholds the 
view that moral behaviour excludes the use of violence; as a political philosophy, it 
maintains that violence is self-perpetuating and can never provide a means to a 
securely peaceful end” (Peace Pledge Union, n.d.). Referring to the unprofitability 
of violence as a means to socio-economic change, it is stated that “Many schools of 
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thought see no other way out of this terrible contrast (that is, the huge economic 
disparity between the masses and the privileged few) than one of violence. Yet 
violence itself is making for much misery” (Mathur & Sharma, 1977, p. 2). 
Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the importance of non-violent approach to 
conflict in terms of the Syrian civil war. Had the Syrian opposition embraced non-
violent approach towards the Syrian government’s violent crackdown, they would 
have won so great international sympathy and support and would have, 
consequently, defeated the government without violent efforts. However, this was 
not the case. A major reason why the Syrian conflict has grown protracted and 
intractable is because the Syrian opposition abandoned non-violent approach and 
adopted a violent one in responding to the Syrian government’s aggression. At the 
beginning of the conflict, the situation was non-violent anti-government mass 
demonstrations across Syria, and this created international approval and 
recognition of the Syrian opposition and condemnation of the Syrian government 
which faced a legitimacy crisis over the use of violence against peaceful 
demonstrators. However, when the opposition lost faith in non-violent approach, 
they turned to violent approach which further militarized the armed conflict, tainted 
their legitimacy, diminished their international appeal and gave the Syrian 
government a cogent reason to unleash its military power on the opposition 
mercilessly. Eventually, the Syrian opposition was harmed and could not withstand 
the Syrian government which has a greater capacity for military violence. One 
reason for the despair of the Syrian opposition is that it is seriously undermined by 
its own internal problems such as disunity and by lack of meaningful support from 
external patrons who themselves are seeking to achieve selfish goals from the 
conflict amidst distrust and cautiousness in dealing with the opposition which has 
displayed disturbing militancy. The adoption of violent approach against the Syrian 
government gave the civil war a sectarian, religious, ethnocentric and other 
identity-related character. Violent approach and the consequent identity colouration 
of the armed conflict attracted local extremist Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham 
and Jabhet al-Nusra whose activities further blacklist the general Syrian opposition 
and contribute in making the conflict intractable and protracted (Tokmajyan, 2015).  
Foreign Islamic fundamentalist groups such as “Muslim Sunnite extremists 
(Salafis) [who] joined the rebels in Syria [and] Shiite militias from Iraq and troops 
from Hezbollah [who] joined the governmental forces” (Tokmajyan, 2015, p. 107) 
contributed to the adoption of violent approach, which has turned the conflict into a 
quagmire. Having turned violent, the Syrian opposition is unable to realise the very 
goal of the uprising, which is to depose the Syrian government, but has only broken 
into multiple fragments and blurred the initial distinction between it and the Syrian 
government in terms of the use of military violence. Also, the rebels’ use of 
violence against government soldiers, rather than demonstrate only peacefully, has 
discouraged military defection to the Syrian opposition as several soldiers feel 
more safe with the government than with the violent opposition; thus, the 
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opposition did not receive many experienced soldiers whose wealth of experience 
would have been significantly helpful against the Syrian government. The counter-
productiveness of violent approach the opposition adopted has unexpectedly turned 
to the government’s favour. This shift from non-violent approach to violent 
approach has not only created multiplicity of rebel groups, it has also worsened the 
violence of the war in such a complex way that continues to hinder peace but 
sustains terrorism and strife even if the Syrian government and the legitimate 
opposition may eventually resolve the conflict. The adoption of violent approach is 
the Syrian opposition’s wrong choice that militarized and complicated the conflict, 
making it prolong and intractable (Tokmajyan, 2015).  
Eventually, Syria has become a hub of Middle East conflict where a civil war 
coloured by sectarianism has caused colossal human losses, economic woe and 
humanitarian crisis amid firm Russian, Iranian and some non-State players’ support 
for the Syrian government, and Western and GCC countries’ support for the Syrian 
opposition (Dalton, 2017). 
 
5. The Syrian Rebels’ Illicit Economy Makes Them Undaunted and 
Prolongs the Civil War 
This argument can be explained within the framework of the economic theory of 
conflict. Generally, through the scholarly explication demonstrated in the classical 
work that became known as Marxism, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich 
Engels (1820-1895) were credited as the fathers of social conflict theory—a broad 
dimension from which all social science theories of conflict derive. But for the 
economic theory of conflict, although Reno (1993) applied the ideas and logic of 
the economic theory of conflict, and Berdal and Malone (2000) explored the greed 
and grievance theories of conflict (both of which have economic implications), 
credit is, however, given to Paul Collier (a former American World Bank 
economist) and Anke Hoeffler for their works: Collier and Hoeffler (1998), 
(2002a), (2002b), (2004); Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2006); and Collier (2000) 
in which they played particularly significant roles in developing the theory. 
Subsequent important works in furtherance of the development and application of 
the theory in explaining the causes of armed conflicts and the incentives for 
protracted armed conflicts have followed after theirs, such as Ross (2004), Collier 
and Sambanis (2005), Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007), Mitra and Ray (2014) and 
Osah, Ogundiwin, and Eti (2017). 
Economic theory of conflict argues that while strong expectation of economic 
gains is the cause of a civil war or constitutes the incentives for rebel leaders to 
start a civil war, actual financial profits derived from the continuous illicit 
exploitation of economic resources—such as natural resources, civilian population, 
loot, foreign aids, forced taxations of any sorts, smuggling of invaluable materials 
like artefacts—constitute the incentive for the protraction of a civil war because 
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such usually huge economic benefits encourage rebel groups and war entrepreneurs 
not to give up fighting. Whatever the cause of a rebellion in a country, the 
sustainability of a protracted and intractable civil war is only possible if the 
rebellious group can sufficiently expropriate and exploit the country’s economic 
resources. In other words, if a civil war is not financially viable or the warring 
parties, especially the rebels, are not financially equipped to sustain their war 
enterprise, such a civil war will not last for a long time. On the contrary, for a civil 
war to prolong, the rebel forces fighting the government must be rich.  
Therefore, the economic theory of conflict perceives rebellion as the ultimate 
demonstration and greatest evidence of organized crime in which rebels pillage and 
exploit productive economic resources to enrich themselves and to sustain the 
financing of their war effort. The core of the argument of the economic theory of 
conflict is the economic determinism of the life of a war; that is, a war prolongs if 
the warring parties are able to sustain a sufficient economic means of prosecuting 
it. In terms of a civil war, greater concern shifts to the rebel forces fighting their 
government—not necessarily the government, for it is usually rich, more 
creditworthy and more equipped with the means of getting steady and significant 
foreign aids from State and non-State allies. A civil war prolongs not only because 
rebel forces are supported by continuous supply of revenues from illicit export of 
or taxes on natural resources, smuggling of economic valuables and “sympathy 
package” from foreign sympathizers and/or supporters, but also because war 
entrepreneurs making huge income from the conflict situation will likely sabotage 
peace initiative and process for ending the war (Naidoo, 2000; Collier, 2000; 
Collier, 2004; Charles & Osah, 2018). Hence, the contention of the economic 
theory of conflict that economic factors constitute the major cause of success or 
failure of armed groups in or from accomplishing goals, such as political and/or 
military goals, is helpful in understanding the argument of Herbert (2014) as to the 
cause of the protraction and intractability of the Syrian civil war.  
Accordingly, given the substructure power of the economy over the superstructure 
of society and ambitions, it can be expected that economically powerful rebel 
forces are confident and undaunted in a conflict with government forces. As 
observed, Syria has smuggling activities which date back to the country’s political 
history since British and French rule. The activities have created deeply entrenched 
smuggling networks and resultant illicit economy in Syria. The civil war in Syria 
has helped smugglers, fixers and illicit war entrepreneurs to establish complex 
illegal institutions that will remain for so long. As the Syrian government lost 
control of its borders and border communities to rebels in the course of the civil 
war, the latter as well as local tribes that inhabit the border communities, who are 
already used to smuggling via Syria’s porous borders, have gained unchallenged 
control over the borders. Thus, they engage in and/or control smuggling activities 
across Syria’s borders and reap huge profits from such activities. Consequently, 
Syrian rebels are able to make a significant amount of profits from illicit trade on 
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smuggled commodities such as oil, drugs and stolen artefacts, and use the profits to 
finance their revolutionary cause against the Syrian government. The rebels are 
resourceful in using the borders to sustain their lucrative smuggling business. The 
huge fortunes they make from the illicit trade via porous borders make them 
relatively economically self-reliant. Such level of financial self-reliance, coupled 
with the financial support they receive from external patrons, offers the rebels 
some confidence and rigidity, thus making them difficult to cajole into peace talks 
in terms other than their preference (Herbert, 2014).  
Rebel leaders and external players that make huge profits from smuggling activities 
of Syria’s illicit economy constitute themselves as saboteurs to peace process 
initiated to end the civil war. The illicit exploitation of Syria’s war economy by the 
Syrian rebel groups has been instrumental in shaping the protraction of Syria’s civil 
war. The absence of governmental control in all aspects of Syria that are firmly 
under the control of various Syrian rebel groups enable them to generate the 
required revenues to sustain the conflict by increasingly depending on all forms of 
external support and by sustaining illicit transnational economic connections and 
trade networks for smuggling natural resources and other stolen valuables out of 
Syria for sale in exchange for the material wherewithal like military hardware and 
logistics needed to sustain the war. Until the Syrian government is able to re-
establish effective control over Syria’s borders once again or until external patrons 
of the rebels discourage the smuggling activities and links, which is less likely, the 
rebels will continue to control a significant illicit source of income to fund 
procurement of arms, payment of smuggling outfits that deliver the arms to them, 
payment of their fighters, and procurement of all other materials necessary to 
prosecute the war against the Syrian government.  This is a critical juncture in the 
civil war in that while the Syrian government suffers from indebtedness and 
financial setbacks due to huge loses of significant sectors of the economy to rebels 
and to the destruction of war, the rebels, who control many of the economic assets 
abandoned by the government and who also receive huge financial support from 
foreign sources, are becoming wealthy enough to keep on fighting against a 
government that is struggling financially. Consequently, it will be difficult for 
foreign patrons of inveigle or sway the rebels to accept diplomatic initiatives 
designed to end the war if such initiates are less favourable to them (Herbert, 
2014). The Syrian civil war is, therefore, protracted because the huge revenues 
rebels are able to generate from smuggling and from Syria’s general illicit 
economy make them buoyant and ready to sustain their combat capability. 
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6. The West Sees Military Action against Bashar al-Assad as 
Unprofitable 
Classical deterrence theory is crucial in explaining this assertion. The theory 
originated with Bernard Brodie (1959) in his work entitled “The Anatomy of 
Deterrence” and was developed through the 1950s and early 1960s by strategic 
thinkers such as Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Oskar Morgenstern, William 
Kaufmann and Glenn Snyder. Rooted in the Realist intellectual tradition and 
balance of power politics, classical deterrence theory argues that peace is likely to 
exist if power is apportioned equally among major actors or groups of actors in the 
international system so that no one actor or group of actors will have the 
motivation or capability to change the status quo and challenge other actors or 
groups of actors. While structural deterrence theory—a strand of classical 
deterrence theory—argues that international stability can be guaranteed if nuclear 
power is distributed in the international system, particularly among great powers, 
in such a way that ensures balance of nuclear power and parity of relationship so 
that it is absurd for one side to start a war, decision-theoretic deterrence theory—
the second strand cum decision-making aspect of classical deterrence theory—
argues that the consequences of a nuclear war is too costly, enormous and dire so 
that no rational leader would want to start a nuclear war as a means of resolving a 
conflict. Essentially, decision-theoretic deterrence theory holds that States that are 
engaged in a conflict, directly or indirectly, may strategize to defeat each other, but 
all of them have a common interest in circumventing or avoiding war (Zagare, 
1996). Although the two strands of the classical deterrence theory enrich the 
argument of the theory, the second strand—decision-theoretic deterrence theory—
provides a more appropriate framework for explicating the assertion that the West 
sees military action against Bashar al-Assad as unprofitable. 
The theory, which explains the operation and constitutive parts of the international 
system, further argues that a State or group of States can be prevented from 
executing the threat to use military action against another State or group of States if 
it is aware that that other State or group of States has an assured military capability 
to retaliate with such a military response that will be so great as to make the 
aggressor’s action unprofitable, make the cost of such aggressive action greater 
than the expected benefits, or that can further provoke a greater conflict resulting in 
mutually assured destruction. With this awareness, the potential aggressor is 
threatened indirectly and will be compelled on its own not to take the intended 
military action. Deterrence warns and convinces a potential aggressor that the use 
of military action against another State would attract a kind of response that will 
inflict unimaginable damage that will outweigh any possible benefits it seeks to 
achieve with taking military action. This assertion leads to the definition of 
deterrence as the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain 
from initiating some course of (military) action. Deterrence policy can be made to 
prevent an armed attack against a State’s own territory (direct deterrence) and/or 
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prevent an armed attack against another State (indirect or extended deterrence). 
The latter happens when a great power becomes involved in a conflict or dispute 
between at least two countries in which a more powerful one is threatening a 
military action against the other, the weaker one (Huth, 1999).  
Deterrence became very important after the Second World War and during the 
Cold War marked by the nuclear arms race between the USA and the former 
USSR. Two important factors for a successful deterrence policy include, firstly, the 
strategy of a defending State to balance the probable coercion and adroit diplomacy 
of the State threatening military attack, by demonstrating proportionality, 
reciprocity and coercive credibility, and, secondly, the degree of vulnerability or 
indefensibility of the threatening State rooted in its political and economic 
conditions (Jentleson & Whytock, 2005). Deterrence emphasizes the importance of 
threat of military retaliation from a threatened State against another State 
threatening it, in order to prevent the threatening State from executing its threat to 
use military force against it, the threatened State, or against any other State while 
pursuing its (the threatening State’s) foreign policy goals. Threat can deter a 
potential aggressor from executing an intended or threatened military action against 
another State because of the huge cost and losses it would incur if it goes ahead to 
execute the intended or threatened military action. Thus, the threat of a possible 
nuclear conflict between the West and Russia, of Russia’s assured retaliatory 
capability and of mutually assured destruction (MAD) deters the West from 
attacking the Syrian government directly and significantly or gravely because such 
an attack is most likely to kill Russian soldiers and destroy their weapons in Syria 
and, then, drag Russia into a West-Syria war, which will possibly escalate into a 
global nuclear war the West does not want. Russia’s military involvement in Syria, 
therefore, is a strategy to prevent military conflict between Syria and the West. 
That is, to deter the West from attacking the Syrian government militarily. The 
West is also reluctant to use military action against the Syrian government given 
secondary forms of deterrence such as the natural geographical barriers in Syria, 
the complicated nature of the Syrian civil war, the anticipated humanitarian crisis 
of enormous degree, and the domestic anti-war atmosphere among Western 
populations. 
Accordingly, although military planners in the West had prepared a robust strategy 
for a possible external military intervention in Syria against the Bashar al-Assad 
government, the strategy has remained at best a white elephant as the West and its 
Arab allies are not ready to implement it because the United States is unwilling to 
lead such military campaign. Pro-intervention voices rely on the West’s military 
achievement against Gaddafi’s government in Libya and are motivated to repeat 
the same in Syria. However, this is an illusory hope because Syria is considerably 
different from Libya in terms of the nature and circumstances of the civil war, loci 
of intense battles, character and organization of the opposition, the opposition’s 
military gains and international relevance, and military might and prowess of the 
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government, among others. The vicissitudes of the war is more favourable to the 
Syrian government. Hence, contrary to Western pro-interventionists’ pressure, the 
Obama administration, which was expected to lead an external military 
intervention in Syria against the Bashar al-Assad government, considered that such 
military intervention would be a huge blunder that will embroil the United States in 
another Middle East war. This is because the West’s military intervention against 
the Syrian government is thought to produce unimaginable catastrophic 
consequences. The Syrian government, if it had to confront a huge enemy army of 
the West headed to destroy it, could, in its final existential defence, become drunk 
in desperation and, thus, display wantonness of behaviour such as to unleash the 
whole array of its conventional, chemical and biological weapons against the 
enemy army, unfriendly neighbours such as Israel, and its own citizens, thus 
leading to untold casualties, regional ramifications, and humanitarian and 
environmental disasters (Lesch, 2012). 
Naturally, Syria has difficult topography characterised by numerous mountains, 
hills, valleys and rivers that will impede the movement, swiftness and mobilization 
of intervening army’s human and material resources. With safe haven likely to be 
provided by ally neighbours—Iraq and Lebanon—, external military intervention 
would achieve an insignificant destruction of Syria’s government armaments, while 
serious humanitarian and domestic political conflicts can ensue in Turkey and 
Jordan if these nations with anti-Assad leaders are required, without assurance of 
victory, to send troops to Syria alongside Western intervening forces against the 
Syrian government.  While the West has not taken any decisive step against the 
Syrian government, it appears to be expecting the government to win the war in a 
less brutal way so that it would not have any reason to yield to the temptation of 
international outrage urging it to intervene. More so, the West is still vacillating 
due to the feeling that Western military intervention against the Syrian government 
would have huge domestic and sectarian aftermath. This irresolute attitude is 
strengthened by the unresolved ideational conflicts as to how to prevent such 
anticipated aftermath, especially where the West is not ready to commit its 
resources in reconstructing Syria after the war and where it distrusts the Islamist-
dominated Syrian opposition supported mainly by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and 
doubts the kind of government the opposition will provide for Syria post-Assad 
(Lesch, 2012).  
The Syrian conflict is, thus, very perplexing. It defies implementation of a wide 
range of possible US policy options intended to resolve it because all such policy 
options will have to face or trigger specific circumstances that will thwart them. 
For example, a possible US decision to allow the Syrian government to sustain 
control over western Syria while itself ceases to support the Syrian opposition, as 
an approach to end the conflict, will be frustrated as Syrian Sunni Muslims would 
not cease to fight the government and as regional foes of the government would 
continue to support the rebels against it and against Iranian leverage in Syria. On 
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the other hand, a US Syrian policy that limits the United States’ operations in Syria 
to fighting terrorism with certain co-operation with Russia does not address the big 
issues that created terrorism in Syria, and will not be able to annihilate ISIS 
because the group is an integral part of the general Sunni rebellion against the 
Syrian government. Even a US Syrian policy aimed at co-operating with Russia in 
operations to combat terrorism will ultimately justify the Syrian government’s 
claim that it is combating terrorists and, thus, encourage it to intensify military 
operations which will eventually worsen Syria’s already dismal humanitarian 
conditions (Dalton, 2017).  
Also, the United States may have calculated that its idea of military action of 
whatever nature and magnitude against the Syrian government will not be serious 
because of Russia’s military presence in Syria and because such military action 
will eventually favour the Syrian government, thereby making it an insignificant 
deterrence or a counter-productive effort entirely. Thus, the Syrian opposition is 
hopelessly stranded in the conflict: the West does not want to get militarily 
involved in Syria in its favour since Russia’s military presence in the country is so 
strong, and they do not want to have a direct conflict with Russia because it will be 
too costly for them (Abboud, 2015). The thinking is that a serious Western military 
attack on the Syria government will amount to aggression against Russia if it 
results in Russian soldiers’ casualties and material losses. The logical consequence 
will be a serious retaliation from Russia which will culminate in a direct war 
between it and the United States. Such military conflict between the two great 
powers can spiral into a full-blown Third World War which the United States is not 
willing to start or fight. On the other hand, a small, limited military attack on the 
Syrian government, for the avoidance of trouble with Russia, will be ineffective 
and incapable of defeating the government. Hence, the United States is indecisive 
to go to war in Syria, and cautious not to enmesh itself in another Middle East 
quagmire. The United States will best be able to contain the civil war within Syria 
so as to prevent a regional escalation which can make the war too problematic. 
However, this measure alone is incapable of resolving the civil war (Sorenson, 
2013). 
 
7. Complicated War in Syria: The Syrian Regime Gains from the 
Opposition’s Misfortune 
Structural conflict theory provides the basis for explaining the protraction and 
intractability of the Syrian civil war from this dimension. Conflict theory itself 
explains the contradictions in society between the State and other political actors as 
well as the roles and consequences of such contradictions on the society and 
politics (Igwe, 2007). From this theoretical standpoint, the structural conflict theory 
sees conflict “as a product of the tension that arises when groups compete for 
scarce resources” and argues that “conflict is built into the particular ways societies 
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are structured or organized. It describes the condition[s] of the society and how 
such condition[s] or environment can create conflict. Conflict occurs in society due 
to the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies or because of domination 
of one class by another” (Folarin, 2014, p. 18). Such conditions include “social 
exclusion, deprivation, class inequalities, injustice, political marginalization, 
gender imbalances, racial segregation, economic exploitation and the likes” 
(Oakland as cited in Folarin, 2014, p. 18). Moreover, the theory believes that 
structural conflicts are caused by the incompatible interests of groups competing 
for scarce resources. In relation to Syria, the dynamics of the Syrian civil war, and 
the internal politics and institutional power structures of the major internal players 
in the civil war—the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition—not only 
account for the reason the civil war has remained protracted and intractable, but 
also reflect incompatible interests represented by the Syrian government, on the 
one hand, and by the Syrian opposition, on the other hand, where the former strives 
to retain the scarce resource—power—, while the latter fights to acquire same 
scarce resource through a violent revolution. 
In consonance with this theory, the dynamics of the Syrian civil war is shaped by 
the age-old structural injustice, marginalization and system corruption created by 
the minority Alawite-Shiite Syrians and their loyalists inclusive of non-Alawite 
Shiites against the majority Sunni Syrians who are structurally disadvantaged. The 
internal politics and institutional power structures of the two major internal parties 
to the civil war reflect a significant difference. For the Syrian government, internal 
politics is characterized by centralism, and institutional power structure reflects a 
monocephalous arrangement. For the Syrian opposition, internal politics reflects 
decentralism, and institutional power structure reveals an acephalous order. 
Against this backdrop, it has been argued that while the Syrian civil war portrays a 
structural problem deep in the fabric of Syrian society, the centralization of power 
on a single body, the Syrian government, personified by a monocephalous figure, 
President Bashar al-Assad, on the one hand, and the decentralized system of power 
and the acephalous nature of leadership of the Syrian opposition, on the other hand, 
place the Syrian government in a better position against the opposition who 
themselves are handicapped by lack of unity, cohesion, singleness of purpose and 
united forces. Given this asymmetric situation, the Syrian rebel groups lack the 
capacity to overthrow the Syrian government, while the latter cannot easily defeat 
the former because they are fairly strong and resilient to keep the war on-going. 
This condition makes the civil war look like an entanglement in which all parties 
have the capacity to fight and make some gains, but, at the same time, none has the 
capability to win the war totally and determinedly. This problem, thus, makes the 
civil war protracted and intractable. 
The Geneva II Conference on Syria held early in 2014 failed to achieve its goal of 
forming a transitional government in Syria because, despite Russia’s support for a 
political solution to the Syrian armed conflict, the representatives of the Syrian 
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government and of the Syrian opposition at the conference failed to reach a 
negotiated mutually agreed resolution on transitional government. This is because 
government representatives rejected the Syrian opposition’s proposal of resignation 
of Bashar al-Assad before starting the Syrian political transition process, while the 
groups that constitute the Syrian opposition, on the other hand, are discordant and 
divisive, with the opposition negotiating body—the Syrian National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces—lacking full representation, 
integration, inclusion and sufficient relations with all rebel groups, including the 
FSA. Similarly, while some Syrian opposition groups refused to dialogue with one 
another, the accredited Syrian opposition groups gave prerequisites for negotiation 
and rejected talks with the government’s delegates (Habets, 2016).  
Generally, the Syrian peace process is rift with complex diplomatic impediments 
and beset by little commitment from the Syrian government and the Syrian 
opposition. This makes mediation by great power patrons of both parties to the 
conflict a difficult endeavour marked so far by insignificant success. The Syrian 
government has also blamed the sluggishness of the peace talks on the legitimacy 
problem and incomprehensive representativeness of the Syrian opposition as well 
as on the tendency of the UN and interest-seeking external players to dictate the 
terms of political transition, which ought to be entirely Syrian originated (Hodge & 
Malas, 2016). Opposed to the demands of the Syrian opposition, Bashar al-Assad 
remains intransigent to persuasion and pressure to step down and end the civil war. 
Instead, under the guise of fighting terrorism, he continues to fight the Syrian 
opposition whose legitimacy has been undermined by its own characteristic 
problems—such as group proliferation; intra-group squabbles, schism and outright 
disintegration; inter-group rivalry; deep suspicion; poor organization; divisiveness; 
and inconsistency—that existed since the civil war started and made them unable to 
articulate a comprehensive and agreeable political or military plan to counter the 
Syrian government forces and end the war. The Syrian opposition is beset by its 
own adverse internal politics. This handicap would make it incapable of forming a 
workable transition government if Bashar al-Assad is deposed. Thus, while the 
Syrian conflict continues, the political transition process has been stalled for fear 
that deposing Bashar al-Assad from power without a ready competent opposition to 
replace him will create a power vacuum which portends a greater danger than 
having Bashar al-Assad in power (Khatib, 2014).  
Some of the rebel groups in the Syrian opposition parade themselves as the only 
representatives of the entire Syrian opposition, even though the complex nature of 
the Syrian conflict discourages the formation of a lasting merger of Syrian 
opposition groups. This behaviour fuels dissension and rancour among the Syrian 
opposition groups and contributes to undermine their legitimacy and to prolong the 
civil war. Besides, media misinformation and false reportage perpetuated by big 
media houses complicate the civil war as they create difficulty in understanding the 
real situation and true story of the war, which is relevant to any sound resolution to 
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be negotiated (“Russian paper studies reasons”, 2012). As the civil war degenerates 
into a very miserable and catastrophic condition, the Syrian government is 
emboldened to fight on because of its military superiority, strong foreign support, 
stable domestic elite support base, and due to the vindictive appetite to avenge the 
killing of some very senior and key Syrian military officers such as the Deputy 
Chief of Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces—Assef Shawkat—who was Bashar al-
Assad’s brother-in-law and second-in-command in Syria. With advantages over the 
FSA, the Syrian government is committed to outright annihilation of all rebel 
fighters, expectant of total victory and, thus, unwilling to negotiate or compromise 
(Khan, 2012).  
The FSA needs adequate human and material resources to be able to effectively 
confront the half a million large, strong and powerful Syrian Arab Army firmly 
loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, but the lack of the wherewithal to handle this 
task is the rebels’ undoing (Khan, 2012). The Syrian opposition groups are also 
undermined by personal conflicts and selfish political ambitions among their 
leaders who are already struggling for a place in an anticipated opposition-led 
government post-Assad. Thus, they fail to coalesce into a single force against the 
Syrian government and to commit to a common approach towards resolving their 
country’s civil war (Lesch, 2012). The war in Syria is now a complex quagmire 
that has wrecked unimaginable destructions across the country and unsettled 
governments in the region and in Europe where it has had serious negative effects. 
It remains explosive and unpredictable. The situation prompts Western 
governments’ thought of military intervention against the Syrian government, but 
this thought has been discouraged by considerable public opposition given the 
problems caused by Western military intervention in Iraq (Habets, 2016). 
The benevolence Bashar al-Assad demonstrated at the beginning of the Syrian 
conflict, even though it was born out of local and international pressure, failed, 
unfortunately, to prevent the conflict from degenerating into a civil war. The Syrian 
government made more concessions to the Syrian Kurds, made minor but vital 
constitutional changes and released fundamentalist political prisoners in the hope 
that the Syrian people would be appeased, amenable and compliant so as to avert a 
civil war. However, these concessions ended up creating the conditions which 
made the armed conflict protracted and intractable. For example, when the Syrian 
government lost control over several regions of Syria, the same freed political 
prisoners who now constitute the vanguard of strong rebel forces/groups such as 
Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS and the YPG took control of those regions, filled the power 
vacuum created there, and became bent on ousting the government. The negligence 
created by the international community following its failure to act timely in Syria 
due mainly to strife and dissension among key regional and extra-regional players 
in the Syrian conflict contributed in helping these groups to become very strong 
and to create their respective defacto States which threaten regional security and 
make the civil war more chaotic (Kahf, 2016). 
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The dynamics of the Syrian civil war is such that neither the Syrian opposition nor 
the Syrian government can win the war. It is very difficult to find an agreeable 
resolution to the conflict due to its highly convoluted nature and associated web of 
internal and external problems. The Syrian opposition groups—comprising 
numerous rebel groups within and outside Syria such as the Local Co-ordination 
Committees (LCCs), the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the FSA—are unable 
to coalesce into a strong, united, well-organized formidable fighting force against 
the Syrian government because they lack independent civil unions, broad 
resources, general unity and solid organizational structure. These handicaps make 
them vulnerable to the scramble and competition of regional powers such as Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and Qatar who seek to establish leverage over the Syrian 
opposition. Also, the Syrian opposition’s military wing, the FSA, lacks the 
coherence, unity, loyalty, centralized and consolidated command structure as well 
as adequate resources needed to confront the Syrian government forces effectively. 
By seeking governmental change in Syria and by supporting the Syrian opposition 
to achieve this goal, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and some other regional States 
have bolstered the morale of the Syrian opposition groups, improved their 
economic strength and further militarized the civil war, on the one hand, and have 
intensified internal strife, discord, suspicion and de-synchronization of their efforts, 
on the other hand.  
There is disaffection between the SNC and the ordinary Syrian protesters seeking 
to reform Syria democratically. The latter challenges the authority of the SNC for 
being foreign-based and lacking real understanding of Syria’s local realities, and 
for sidelining ordinary Syrian activists that are not ideologically inspired. The local 
and exiled self-interested Syrian activists who high-jacked Syria’s popular anti-
Assad demonstrations and formed the Syrian opposition and its military wing are 
unable to oust the Syrian government because they are disunited and fractious, and 
this handicap enables the government to continue to prosecute the war against 
them. Both the home-based and foreign-based Syrian opposition groups lack 
adequate support from their Western sponsors. Their efforts to make the countries 
that want governmental change in Syria to provide material support for that cause 
are futile as the countries failed to match their desire with action. Hence, 
insufficient resources, especially finance and weapons, compel the Syrian 
opposition to accept truces as they could not sustain the momentum of their 
victories, the management of territorial gains and the marshalling and deployment 
of their forces against strong government counter-offence and against emergent 
Islamist terrorist forces that are aggressive towards ordinary Syrian opposition 
groups (Abboud, 2015).  
Hence, while the Syrian government fails to exercise full control across Syria, the 
FSA suffers territorial losses as it is unable to sustain control, on behalf of the 
general Syrian opposition, over territories abandoned by government forces. The 
opposition’s material lack and inability to coalesce their political and military 
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wings into an indivisible centrally administered entity led to the emergence of 
several rebel groups, including Islamist groups, many of which took up arms to 
defend their immediate communities against government forces and hostile rebel 
groups, and all of which strove against one another over control of abandoned 
territories. This situation increased the number of fighters, heightened the violence, 
further militarized the conflict and fragmented Syria into numerous pockets of 
territories held defacto and weakly controlled by discordant rival rebel groups’ 
authorities.  This situation encourages dissension, selfishness, weak and short-lived 
co-operation, and fragile communications among the Syrian opposition (Abboud, 
2015). With disunity and internal strife, the Syrian rebels are seriously undermined: 
they struggle to possess and control ISIS’s and government forces’ territorial 
losses. Their inability to form a united coherent front also draws from their 
Western and Arab patrons’ discrimination and refusal to co-operate with many 
Salafist rebel groups such as al-Nusra Front declared a terrorist group. There is an 
interest-based division among these patrons over which rebel groups to support and 
not to support, and this has contributed in setting the opposition back (Ibrahim, 
2017).  
On the other hand, having incurred huge military and territorial losses, and facing 
the likelihood of defeat, the Syrian government also established ancillary combat 
forces comprising local militias mainly of Alawite origin and regional militias from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq whose efforts, coupled with the considerable 
military support of Lebanese Hezbollah militia, Iran and Russia, have substantially 
given the Syrian government some leverage over the opposition. The involvement 
of these actors also further militarizes the conflict and intensifies its violence. The 
military and territorial losses of the Syrian government did not result in the 
emergence of a dominant rebel group. Instead, three dominant opposition bodies 
have emerged and are competing strongly with the Syrian government. Syria is, 
consequently, split into the following four administrative fragments with 
administrative authorities opposed to each other, namely “Damascus and north 
through Homs and to the coast; Kurdish areas organized under an autonomous 
administration in three cantons in the north and northeast, known as Rojava; areas 
held by Islamic State (ISIS) in the eastern parts of the country; and areas under the 
control of the FSA and Islamist-dominated military fronts, such as Jaish al-Fateh 
(Army of Conquest), in the northwestern and southern parts of the country” 
(Abboud, 2015, p. 341).  
As the powerful rebel groups that control these parts of Syria abandoned by the 
Syrian government are unwilling to surrender these territorial gains, Syria 
apparently faces disintegration into three States—a Sunni State, an Alawite State 
and a Kurdish State—based on strongholds held by the Sunni Islamist rebels, 
Alawite-led Syrian government, and Kurdish rebels. ISIS effect on the Syrian 
armed conflict portends continuous crisis in Syria post-Assad. This fear inspires the 
thinking in several circles in the West that Bashar al-Assad should retain power in 
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order to oversee the transition of power to the opposition in a way that guarantees 
stability. This contemplation by the West and their attendant reluctance to be 
actively involved in the civil war also help to prolong the war (Monshipouri & 
Wieger, 2014). The forceful fragmentation of Syria into many territories illegally 
governed by many competing rebel forces, the failure of world leaders to provide 
and adopt an agreeable political resolution that can end the armed conflict, as well 
as the humanitarian and refugee catastrophe to which too many Syrians have been 
too long exposed, contribute significantly to the protraction of the Syrian armed 
conflict and leave Syrians only with serious economic suffering, violence and 
humanitarian crisis. Given the high level of militarization and deterioration of the 
conflict, formulating a panacea to correct the horrific situation in Syria and to cause 
a successful political transition is practically impossible, especially as Russia and 
Iran are strongly bolstering the Syrian government against its domestic and foreign 
adversaries that are also opposed to Russia and Iran (Abboud, 2015). 
Consequently, the protracted Syrian civil war has finally assumed a kind of 
violence that no party, whether internal or external, is able to manage effectively. It 
has now become a compounded and disastrous war of attrition with diminished 
hopes of resolution, and slim chances of victory for either the government or the 
rebel group forces. With many government sieges, the war has reached a stalemate.  
 
8. Blame the Protraction of the Syrian Civil War on External Players 
The behaviour of external players in the Syrian civil war can be explained by the 
national role theory. National role theory is a conceptual framework of analysis in 
international politics and foreign policy studies, inspired by role theory in 
sociology and social psychology, which characterize the role of individuals in the 
society. The theory inquires into the question of “how do policymakers view the 
roles their nations should play in international affairs” (Holsti, 1970, p. 235)? 
Although the theory has been systematically applied to the study of political 
phenomena by a few scholars such as John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William 
Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson in their 1962 publication entitled “The 
Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior”, it was popularized by 
Kalevi Holsti in his 1970 work entitled “National Role Conception in the Study of 
Foreign Policy”. Holsti leans on John Dewey’s and George Herbert Mead’s works 
in sociology and social psychology in developing national role theory for foreign 
policy analysis. In conceptualizing national role, Holsti (1970, p. 245) defines 
national role performance “as the general foreign policy behavior of government 
… include[ing] patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and 
commitments towards other states.” The theory argues that sovereign States 
“maintain general orientations towards the external environment and fulfil certain 
functions within the international system…” (Holsti, 1970, p. 247). He further 
explains national role as: 
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“the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, 
rules and actions suitable to their states, and of the functions, if any, their states 
should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate 
regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of 
their state towards, or in, the external environment. Typical national role 
conceptions would be regional defender, with the function of protecting other states 
in a defined area, or mediator, with the continuing function of assisting in 
international conflict resolution” (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245-246). 
In the process of determining the foreign policy goals and objectives of their 
nations, policymakers, through both institutional and external role prescriptions as 
well as self-conceptions of role, define the roles of their nations in the international 
system which will be pursued in line with some set foreign policy goals and 
objectives. The theory pays attention to understanding the thinking of leaders of 
States, their understanding of the international system and of the roles of their 
States in the system. It relates to the roles nations assume upon themselves as well 
as those trust upon them by other nations given their international status, to 
perform on behalf of other nations. It also considers role prescriptions from the 
external environment as an integral part of the national role of a State. This 
theoretical framework helps explain that the dynamics of external environment, 
rather than internal conditions in Syria, and the self-seeking behaviour of external 
players are responsible for the protraction and intractability of the Syrian civil war. 
External environment represents external players such as the European Union, 
European countries acting individually, Russia and the United States and countries 
of the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Iran whose behaviour has also 
contributed significantly to prolonging and compounding the Syrian armed 
conflict. The roles these nations are playing in the Syrian civil war represent their 
political elites’ conceived national roles their countries should be playing in that 
armed conflict and, by extension, the role expectation other nations in the 
international system “thrust” upon them. 
The armed conflict in Syria has grown intricate and international, with powerful 
external State actors providing military support to the Syrian government and the 
Syrian rebel forces alike, according to where their interests lie (Dalton, 2017).  The 
involvement of several international players, some on the camp of the Syrian 
government and some others on the camp of the Syrian opposition, serve to 
compound the Syrian civil war. Russia, China (to a small extent), Iran, Lebanese 
Hezbollah and Yemeni Houthis are supporting the Syrian government for their own 
anti-Western and anti-Saudi interests. While Russia provides the greatest 
diplomatic and military cover that has kept the government afloat, with China 
playing a minimal role, Iran and the others have military personnel on ground and 
light arms to support the government. On the other hand, the EU, Western powers 
of the United States, Britain and France, and Arab powers of Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey and other Gulf States are backing various Syrian opposition groups, with 
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comparatively uncommon goals, to oust the Syrian government so that they can 
control Syria’s government to be formed by the opposition in order to achieve their 
fairly common Middle East strategic goals. These international players on the side 
of the Syrian opposition have historical hostility and ambivalence against the 
Ba’athist Party and the al-Assad government since the party came to power in the 
1970s. The selfish and conflictual involvement of external players in the Syrian 
conflict only intends to maximize their own selfish national interests that can be 
realized only through the success of the internal parties they support. These players 
are less likely interested in resolving the Syrian civil war altruistically for Syria’s 
own sake. Without caution, they are more likely to have a direct conflict as they 
help to prolong the war (Ibrahim, 2017). 
In the light of this, the continuous selfish scramble for supremacy and greater 
leverage in Syria between pro-Assad Iran alongside its regional allies, on the one 
hand, and anti-Assad Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, contributes to the protraction 
and difficulty in resolving the Syrian civil war. Iran supports the Syrian 
government because it does not want to lose its strategic leverage and control over 
Syria which is vitally important to the maintenance of military, political and 
economic influence as well as communications with Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
Hamas in Palestine. Conversely, Saudi Arabia and Qatar—the most vocal 
advocates of governmental change in Syria—are engaged in activities capable of 
splitting Syria into small pieces and threatening pro-Assad parts of the cleavages.  
While Iran and Hezbollah consider the Syrian civil war as a life threat to them and 
therefore see continued pro-Assad military activities as imperative, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar do not prioritize democratization of Syria; their foremost goal is to 
destroy whatever leverage Iran has in Syria. Without addressing the differing 
interests of these pro-Assad and anti-Assad regional actors and without resolving 
their confrontational stands against each other, the Syrian armed conflict tends to 
remain in its protracted and intractable situation (Mohns & Bank, 2012). 
Saudi Arabia recognizes the Syrian conflict as an integral part of its regional strife 
and competition with Iran. Accordingly, Saudi priorities in the civil war are to 
incapacitate Iran and sabotage its military endeavour in Syria and to oust the Syrian 
government; not the immediate defeat of Islamist terrorism. To achieve this goal, 
the kingdom strongly supports blacklisted extremist rebel groups. While Saudi 
Arabia is most unlike to achieve these anti-Iran and anti-Assad ambitions, 
increased Saudi support for Islamist extremist rebel groups fortuitously count in 
ISIS’s favour. As the Syrian armed conflict assumes regional importance, countries 
in the Middle East are adjusting their alliances around the framework of Sunni–
Shia sectarian divide led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively. Political leaders 
are using this divide to exploit the emotions of the very religious Arab population 
to worsen the violence of the war. The use of Syria’s civil war to intensify the old 
rat race between Iran and Saudi Arabia over regional supremacy, where both 
countries are less committed to a political solution to the war, can only widen the 
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sectarian divide and make a negotiated political settlement to be beyond the reach 
of diplomacy.  
The contradictory geostrategic interests and the consequent hostile regional 
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia are predicated on sharply differing 
Islamic sectarian articles of faith, with origin in several decades of rivalry. These 
unhealthy competition and conflicting interests have once again found expression 
in the Syrian civil war in which Shi’ite Iran, on the one hand, provides significant 
military, technical, political and financial support to the Syrian government of 
Bashar al-Assad—an old and reliable Shi’ite Muslim ally of Alawite extraction—to 
defeat a serious threat of overthrow posed by the mainly Sunni Syrian opposition, 
and Sunni Saudi Arabia (alongside Sunni Qatar and the UAE), on the other hand, 
provides similar support to mainly Sunni Islamist rebels such as the FSA and the 
Islamic Front to overthrow the Syrian government. The adversarial involvement of 
Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian civil war highlights a serious proxy war 
between the two countries which attracts considerable attention as the prolonged 
civil war itself. Iran is seeking to pervade Shi’ite Islam across the Middle East, first 
by securing leverage along the Levant crescent (from Iran down to Lebanon 
adjoining the Mediterranean Sea), and then to diminish the potency of Sunni Islam 
personified by Saudi Arabia, whereas Saudi Arabia, together with less powerful 
Gulf countries, is bent on containing Iran and undermining regional spread of 
Shi’ite Islam. Syria, a multi-confessional society with Sunni majority population 
without power and Shi’ite minority population with centralized power for several 
decades, bears all the trappings of Sunni-Shi’ite Islamic sectarian conflict for 
decades. The civil war happening there has become the greatest incident of Sunni-
Shi’ite Islamic sectarian showdown of which Iran and Saudi Arabia are logically 
enmeshed, with each country trying to emasculate the other’s influence and impose 
its own values or strengthen them.  The irreconcilable selfish goals of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, therefore, make the Syrian civil war protracted and intractable. To 
this, any resolution that discountenances the interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia will 
be futile naturally (Monshipouri & Wieger, 2014). 
The West is not ready to be actively involved in the Syrian civil war; instead, it 
limits its role to providing military equipment and training, while it expects the 
Syrian locals to fight the civil war themselves. Among the local Syrians left to fight 
for themselves, Syrian Kurds have been able to gain strong control over Kurdish 
region in northern Syria and are reluctant to be involved in the broader war against 
the Syrian government, which would have increased the chances of the rebels 
defeating the government (Mitton, 2016). While the success on the part of the 
Syrian Kurds has created a fresh conflict between them and Turkey, the conflict, 
unfortunately, has been heightened by their ambition of statehood in northern Syria 
where they have effective control. Consequently, Turkey, which will never allow 
an independent Kurdish State out of Syria for the fear that such development would 
encourage Turkish Kurds to take a cue, is embroiled in a conflict with the United 
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States and Russia who both accidentally support the Syrian Kurds against ISIS. 
Turkey believes that the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is 
involved in conflict with Syrian Arabs over land encroachment, has direct links 
with Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which it perceives as a terrorist 
organization contrary to US judgment and that, for this reason, the YPG should be 
subverted and denied autonomy. For this reason, also, Turkey indirectly supports 
ISIS to degrade the Kurds in northern Syria while the United States and Russia 
support and co-ordinate with the Kurds in fighting ISIS. Western approach towards 
the Syrian conflict aggravates the violence and provokes pro-government and anti-
government external interventions. By encouraging Saudi Arabia and its regional 
allies to be much more involved in the conflict and by increasing training for 
Kurdish forces, the United States and Canada respectively prolong the conflict, 
promote a complicated war and make settlement difficult (Mitton, 2016; Dalton, 
2017; Rabinovich, 2017). While the United States is divided over how to engage in 
the armed conflict, the EU is opposed to military intervention. Turkey is in conflict 
with the Syrian Kurdish armed front (the YPG) and strongly opposes the 
involvement of the Kurdish political front, the Democratic Union Party, in Syria’s 
peace process. Hence, it has refused to co-operate fully with the United States and 
Russia in resolving the Syrian civil war because they support the Syrian Kurdish 
armed group whose cause opposes Turkey’s interest (Habets, 2016).    
The decision of the West to be passive over the Syrian civil war and not to 
intervene directly but to leave it to Syrians themselves has created dissension 
among the Syrian opposition and splintered Syria along Sunni-Shia sectarian 
divides. This condition has given rise to the regional sectarian dimension of the 
conflict, which has attracted and engaged Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively 
leading Shia and Sunni interests, in a proxy war with no genuine concern for the 
ordinary Syrian people. The Syrian conflict has transcended the threshold of 
reversibility because the West failed to intervene decisively when the conflict was 
new and manageable, as such action would have obviated the current disastrous 
condition of the conflict. Despite this understanding, the West is not still ready to 
send ground forces to Syria and be fully involved in the war, even though it is 
interested in it, because of the lingering apprehension and painful lessons the 
United States and its NATO allies have learnt from deep and full engagement in 
the Afghan and Iraqi wars that have defied resolution and discontinuity. Instead, 
while choosing to play a limited role, the West, in a collective decision, has pushed 
the greatest responsibility of dealing with the Syrian conflict to regional countries 
and Syrian locals, urging them to be actively involved in the conflict militarily as a 
united front, and arguing that it is their war since they have the greatest interests at 
stake. The West’s decision to allow the Middle East conflict to take a natural 
course and not to join the war in Syria is based on the belief that the temptation to 
intervene in the Syrian civil war will enmesh it in yet another labyrinth of quandary 
in a volatile Middle East. This non-interventionist position of the West has caused 
untold humanitarian and refugee crisis and friction among world powers with 
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vested interests, consequently heightening the escalation, protraction and 
intractability of the conflict (Mitton, 2016).   
The West is hypocritical about resolving the Syrian civil war. On the one hand, it 
encourages intra-Syrian negotiations between the Syrian government and the 
Syrian opposition as a way to resolve the conflict, but, on the other hand, it artfully 
drives the negotiations into a stalemate which sustains violence and fighting, by 
persuading some opposition groups not to participate in the negotiations as a way 
of protest, among others. The West encourages and benefits from the stalemated 
dialogues that have made the conflict insoluble up to now because, having no 
genuine interest in institutionalizing democracy in the Middle East such a lingering 
conflict situation helps to ensure continuous Western domination of the region with 
little or no risk (“Russian paper studies”, 2012). However, even if the West decides 
to intervene in Syria, a US-led intervention will be catastrophic. More so, it is 
difficult for the West to find a responsible and reliable group to represent the 
Syrian opposition and help it to craft a comprehensive plan for the future (Lesch, 
2012). 
Furthermore, the campaign of other external powers such as Turkey and the United 
States to undermine and exclude Iran from multilateral peace process concerning 
the Syrian armed conflict does not help in resolving the conflict. Although Turkey 
has improved diplomatic relations with Iran and gradually appreciates and supports 
Iran’s involvement in Syria’s peace process, the United States is unbending in its 
stand against Iran. Opposed to Iran’s role in the Middle East, the United States is 
using its leverage to exclude Iran from participating in Syria’s peace process, and 
has succeeded in pressuring the UN to withdraw Iran’s participation in the Geneva 
II Peace Talk, which ended in failure nevertheless. The United States holds fast to 
its anti-Iran orientation, ignoring pressure and persuasion to support Iran’s 
participation in resolving Syria’s armed conflict. Iran is believed to have the 
greatest influence over Bashar al-Assad and thus is in a special position to sway 
him into embracing political transition and ending the civil war. The continuous 
US opposition to Iran’s involvement in the settlement of Syria’s civil war is 
detrimental to any prospect of reaching an agreeable resolution of the conflict, and 
by the same token makes the conflict protracted and intractable (Monshipouri & 
Wieger, 2014). This point is highlighted by the statements, “The US policy of 
isolating Iran helps further prolong Syria’s agony and feeds instability in the 
Middle East” (Monshipouri & Wieger, 2014, p. 160) and “the US knows very well 
that if ever the day comes that Bashar al-Assad needs to go quietly, Iran is the only 
country capable of achieving that” (Monshipouri & Wieger, 2014, p. 161).  
As the United States remains increasingly opposed to Iran, the option of a 
negotiated political settlement on US terms, without Iran’s participation, will be 
futile as Russia does not have a magic wand to inveigle Iran and as Iran would 
reject any resolution that is designed to oust the Syrian government. The peace 
process will be made more intricate because if Iran decides to seek a friendly and 
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malleable substitute for Bashar al-Assad in order to protect its interest in the 
Levant, the United States would reject the idea as it would not serve US interests in 
Syria. Also, Russia is not likely to accept a negotiated political settlement on US 
terms as the Russian and Syrian governments have the greater leverage to influence 
any proposed political settlement, having made the biggest military and political 
gains out of the conflict. Attempt to compel Russia into submission to US whims 
and caprices over Syria could be counter-productive as Russia could resort to 
demonstration of military might. These irreconcilable interests of external actors 
encourage the protraction and intractability of the Syrian civil war (Dalton, 2017). 
These problems have diminished the prospect of any diplomatically negotiated 
political solution to the Syrian civil war. Moreover, the little hopes left for a 
diplomatic settlement are sadly dashed, on the one hand, by the aggressive 
behaviour the United States, under President Trump administration, has started 
displaying towards the Syrian government and, on the other hand, by the current 
estranged relations between the United States and Russia, even with Donald Trump 
as US President; this is in stark contrast to the expectation of improved Russo-
American relations under Trump’s administration (Rabinovich, 2017). 
Russia’s and China’s opposition to any external military intervention in Syria 
developed against the backdrop of NATO’s abuse of UNSC resolution 1973 in 
Libya when it, instead of implementing a no-fly-zone in Libya, deliberately aided 
the Libyan opposition forces with airpower that contributed significantly to the 
death of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. While the emergence of Islamist 
militia groups in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen after the revolutions that 
happened in those countries further discouraged anti-Western voices, mainly 
Russia and China, from supporting a similar intervention in Syria for fear of 
reproducing in Syria the quagmire in Libya, the catastrophic and disheartening 
socio-political crisis in Libya post-Gaddafi qualifies as a sound reason why the 
West must not contemplate intervening in Syria militarily. For many countries, 
Western military intervention in Libya has now become a reference point as to why 
external intervention in Syria has to be rejected. Eventually, world leaders are 
unable to support the Syrian opposition directly due to diplomatic hurdles created 
by Russia and China in punishing the West for their reckless and imprudent 
behaviour in Libya (Lesch, 2012; Nuruzzaman, 2013). In the absence of any major 
or formidable external military threat, the Syrian government continues 
undauntedly with its war against the opposition (Nuruzzaman, 2013). While 
powerful countries are exploiting already shattered Syria to compete for diplomatic 
and military victory against the other, the international community itself has dallied 
in vain without being able to resolve the civil war. World powers’ quest to 
maximize their national interests in Syria’s civil war, coupled with the impotence 
of the international community in the face of the apparently insoluble civil war, 
actually adds to the protraction and intractability of conflict. The height of this 
unproductive behaviour is a stalemate and loss for all parties (“Syria’s Insoluble 
Puzzle”, 2016).  
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The United States’ insistence on the resignation or ouster of Syria’s President, 
Bashar al-Assad, weakened the international community’s confidence in the peace 
process and gave the Syrian government a reason to fight desperately for its 
survival and to despise any negotiation that will not involve it. Even though it is 
quite profitable, by remaining in Syria indefinitely even after ISIS had been 
physically defeated, the United States and Russia have established their military 
presence in the country, thus raising the chances of confrontation between them as 
well as intensifying the tempo of the war by increasing support to the opposing 
legitimate parties to the conflict (Collin, 2018). This development is a reflection of 
the stand-off between the West and Russia over the Syrian civil war. Russia and 
the West hold conflicting positions as to how to resolve the civil war. While Russia 
opposes external military intervention in Syria by making reference to the 
disastrous aftermath of the West’s military intervention in Iraq and Libya, and 
therefore wants to protect the Bashar al-Assad government and allow Syrians to 
decide the future of their country, the West, on the other hand, desires the 
resignation of Bashar al-Assad or his forceful overthrow through external military 
intervention before the determination of the future of Syria can happen. As the 
opposing views of Russia and the West become more serious, the latter brands the 
former a hindrance to diplomatic progress to halt the Syrian civil war, while Russia 
insists it is only playing the role of an unbiased actor and condemns the West as 
pretentiously seeking to use humanitarian cover to depose Bashar al-Assad for 
being against the West (Brown, 2014). Notwithstanding the conflict of ideas 
between the West and Russia as to how to manage the Syrian civil war and combat 
Islamist terrorism, certain co-operation between Russia and the United States is 
needed in achieving their mutual interests in the fight against Islamist terrorism and 
in the stability of the Middle East. The further involvement of more external actors, 
the pursuit of more irreconcilable goals and the provision of more military backing 
for different groups by different big powers can ruin the success already achieved, 
intensify the civil war and drag in many newer actors (Valenta & Valenta, 2016). 
The prolongation of the civil war seems to imply that international actors do not 
want the Syrian government to collapse as its existence is necessary for the 
maintenance of a global balance of power in the Middle East. They cannot afford 
the danger that a shift of power in Syria to a dangerous Islamic group would cause 
the world. However, Russia and the United States are promoting conflicting goals 
and are using the Syrian armed conflict to play a game of chess involving 
alignment and realignment vis-à-vis the dynamics of the conflict, in order to ensure 
that their national interests are defended and sustained notwithstanding the 
sufferings of Syrians. The international community is implicated for the protraction 
and intractability of the civil war in Syria by increasingly failing to treat the 
primary causes of the armed conflict. Foreign governments which support the 
Syrian opposition, including the United States, are not willing to help the rebels to 
win the war. Instead, they supply the rebels with minimal non-lethal military 
materials only necessary for self-defence and maintenance of internal balance of 
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power against the Syrian government, but not for effective territorial expansion or 
overthrow of the government. Several of the foreign patrons are reluctant to 
provide substantial military aids to the rebels because they fear that such support 
can be used against them by terrorist groups among the rebels. The international 
diplomacy that ensured such minimal military supply to the Syrian opposition 
underlines the international tendency to maintain a global balance of power by not 
deposing the Syrian government. Accordingly, resolutions such as UNSC 
Resolutions 2042 and 2043 and the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012 were not 
intended to end the war, but to limit it within Syria and prevent a military victory 
for both the Syrian government and the opposition. Consequently, international 
diplomacy for Syria has been decried by some regional and international patrons of 
the Syrian opposition (Kahf, 2016).  
By late 2012 and early 2013, the Syrian opposition had expected a quick victory 
that would have ended the conflict after its forces, advantaged by increased 
external military and political support, overwhelmed the Syrian government forces 
and took at least 60 per cent of Syrian territory from the government. But weak 
international support eroded their early expectation of victory and eventually 
undermined their war enthusiasm and hopes. Conversely, the considerable political, 
diplomatic and military support from Russia and Iran strengthened the Syrian 
government’s position against the rebels whose morale to mount a stiff resistance 
against the government has dropped due to diminished Western support.  Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries that also provided support to the Syrian 
opposition to overthrow the Syrian government are also failing in their strategy 
because of Russia’s active involvement in the armed conflict and lack of major 
support from the United States (Kahf, 2016). Despite the demonstrated strength 
and ardour and the huge commitment of the FSA led by several defectors from the 
Syrian Arab Army, diminished external military support from its foreign patrons 
has been a major reason the rebel military body is practically unable to overthrow 
the Syrian government (Khan, 2012). 
Various international coalitions fighting terrorism in Syria, such as the US-led, 
Russia-led and Saudi-led international coalitions, assign too much emphasis on the 
fight against terrorism, making it look like the war is all about fighting terrorism. 
For instance, the United States’ action in Syria is self-contradictory and does not 
take the broader security challenges of the whole region into consideration in that 
while it is aimed at fighting ISIS, on the one hand, it supports other known-but-
less-dangerous terrorism-inclined rebel groups against the Syrian government. The 
methods adopted by different external powers to resolve the conflict are futile and 
only serve to help “the marginalized powers in creating a perpetual conflict zone 
for years to come” because the methods are contradictory and opposed to any 
concerted efforts to end the war (Kahf, 2016, p. 26). This, unfortunately, has 
triggered too many socio-political tussles which further deteriorate the gloomy 
conflict situation. Regrettably, the very problem and major causes of the armed 
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conflict are taken out of spotlight, set aside and unaddressed, making the Syrian 
government’s narrative that the war is all about fighting terrorism, even more true 
(Kahf, 2016).  
Several multilateral diplomatic efforts intended to end the civil war, such as the 
Geneva Peace Talks, Moscow Peace Talks and the Vienna Peace Talks, have failed 
to yield a solution to end the war because the countries involved in the peace 
processes have largely contradictory regional interests and are seeking to protect 
their selfish interests against the collective multilateral interest of all. Powerful 
regional States have differing opinions as to how to end the civil war: all of them 
lack any practical political strategy to resolve it. Thus, the conflict continues 
without a political or military solution to it (Abboud, 2015). Whilst the United 
States displays aggressive behaviour towards the Syrian government and believes 
that military means is necessary to overthrow it, the behaviour and belief have not 
resulted in a military intervention against the government. However, this behaviour 
only constitutes an impediment to a peaceful resolution of the civil war. Moreover, 
while Bashar al-Assad is under pressure from several international actors to resign, 
the Syrian opposition itself lacks the capability and competence to govern Syria 
post-Assad. Despite the fact that the involvement of foreign countries in the armed 
conflict is helpful in pushing for an end to it, it has also pushed the war far from 
settlement in the near future because the countries are selfishly involved; they 
pursue national interests, identify with friendly parties, and are opposed to 
unfriendly parties. But the Syrian government looks more confidently to victory 
and has developed reluctance to negotiate with the opposition because it receives 
steady and significant support from Russia and Iran. This guarantees the 
government’s continued existence. Hence, the West and the Gulf States are 
incapable of deposing Bashar al-Assad because even though they do not want him 
to remain in power, they have no direct military engagement in Syria against the 
government to make this possible (Groarke, 2016).  
While the international community has been actively involved in finding a solution 
to the Syrian conflict, the behaviour of world powers towards the conflict only 
increases its transnational humanitarian crisis and makes it difficult to resolve 
(Habets, 2016). The concerted efforts of the international community to settle the 
Syrian civil war amidst fighting ISIS had led to the Vienna Peace Talk and the 
endorsement of UNSC Resolution 2254, among others. The international 
community’s effort to restart peace talks following progress made against ISIS in 
2017 led to the UN-led Geneva IV Peace Talk (involving the Syrian government 
and the High Negotiations Committee), the Astana Peace Talk, and the Sochi Peace 
Talk—the latter being an indirect negotiation between the Syrian government and 
the opposition, supervised by Russia, Turkey and Iran. However, the failure of the 
international community to compel the Syrian government to reframe from 
violence caused the latter, which was encouraged by its military gains, to resume 
hostilities with hope of a military victory. This shortcoming has halted these peace 
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processes and caused the failure of the four de-escalation zones including parts of 
Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo provinces; an enclave in northern Homs province; 
eastern Gouta near Damascus; and areas of the Derra and Quneitra provinces 
(Collin, 2018).  
Again, the trilateral efforts of Russia, Iran and Turkey towards determining how to 
execute the ceasefire agreement of the Astana Peace Talk have been stalled 
because Iran and Russia are divided over United States’ future participation in the 
Astana Peace Talk as Iran objects to Russia’s position that the United States should 
be involved in the Peace Talk in the future. Similarly, the Syrian opposition, on 
their part, rejects Iran’s participation in the Astana Talks (Dalton, 2017). This 
situation makes the hopes of a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict to be slim. 
Like the negotiated agreement between the United States and Russia lacks the 
framework to provide a permanent solution to the civil war, other peace processes 
initiated by the Arab League; United Nations and Arab League Joint Envoys to 
Syria (including Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and Staffan de Mistura); and by 
Geneva I, Geneva II and Geneva III Peace Talks have unfortunately yielded little 
or no success due to protraction and politicization of the war, unfavourable external 
involvement, and poor representation of Syrian people in all the peace conferences 
(Albasoos, 2017). 
Rival regional and extra-regional actors whose selfish pursuit of national strategic 
interests in Syria hinders the resolution of the Syrian civil war want to be sure that 
such interests are maintained in the country and in the region whatever the outcome 
of the civil war. With this in mind and given the emergence of new influences and 
security threat as well as the fluid and volatile nature of the civil war, there have 
been issue-based and interest-driven alliances and re-alliances among regional and 
international rival actors who are responding to the new realities and seeking to 
wield influence on the course and outcome of the civil war (Güney, 2013). Russia’s 
direct military intervention and the West’s indirect technical role in Syria alongside 
their Arab allies encourage the shifts in alliances among Syrian opposition groups 
some of which are vacillating between radical and moderate ideologies. While 
these shifts were also encouraged by Western diplomatic activities, they depended 
on the calculations and basic values of the Syrian opposition groups involved. The 
shifts have prevented the chances of identifying competent groups or individuals in 
the Syrian opposition who can represent the entire rebel groups and be engaged in 
the peace process to resolve the conflict (“Russia’s role and talk”, 2016). 
Discriminatory preferences and support for different Syrian rebel groups by 
different international actors such as the United States, the EU, Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
and Turkey, on the one hand, and alliance and counter-alliance of rebel groups, on 
the other hand, also contribute to undermine the strength of the opposition and 
impinge on their capability to create strong balance of power and deterrence 
against government forces. The discriminatory behaviour of these external players 
further fractured the Syrian opposition. Yet, the opposition is unwilling to 
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surrender to the Syrian government. While Russia and Iran provide complementary 
support to the Syrian government in protection of their own national interests, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, however, proffer conflicting support to different groups of 
the opposition: this reflects their antagonism and also weakens the opposition. All 
of these events have undermined the Syrian opposition before the Syrian 
government forces which profit from the situation (Khatib, 2014; Habets, 2016). 
The anti-war current of America’s scholarly circle, a section of the political class, 
and general public restrains the US government from acting against the Syrian 
government militarily in order to end the long war, and this consequently dispirits 
its Western and Middle Eastern allies who are fully prepared militarily against the 
Syrian government but only waiting for US leadership. The US government is, 
therefore, compelled to abandon the thought of military intervention in Syria to end 
the country’s civil war (Outzen, 2014). Huge cost of executing military 
intervention against the Basher al-Assad government and reminiscence of the 
horror of the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq post-9/11 constitute the 
grounds for the lack of popular domestic support for a US military intervention in 
Syria (Dalton, 2017). However, the option of US military intervention in Syria, 
which could either overthrow the Syrian government or change the balance of 
power in favour of the opposition, is not attractive because the success of the 
option will largely depend on the involvement of a huge US land troops which the 
US government is not willing to provide. Also, the option is less likely to be 
adopted because implementing it raises a high risk of US direct military 
confrontation with Russia and Iran, and collision with Turkey which strongly 
denounces the Kurdish YPG which the United States will unavoidably co-opt into 
this cause. It also risks fostering the resurgence of Islamist terrorism (Dalton, 
2017). US military intervention in Syria is much less likely because the passive and 
diplomatic attitudes of the Obama administration towards the Syrian civil war has 
encouraged massive military involvement of Russia in favour of the Syrian 
government and furtherance of its superpower global posture, by extension; this 
situation turned the tide of the war and placed the Syrian government in a great 
position against the opposition, with a prolonged and intractable civil war, which 
has defied several diplomatic efforts to resolve it, as a consequence (Rabinovich, 
2017). 
 
9. Summary and Conclusion 
The paper contains seven theory-based accounts as to the reason why the Syrian 
civil war is protracted and intractable. The first account blames the UN and UNSC 
for this problem. It argues that the war is prolonged and difficult to end because of 
the institutional weakness of the UN and the acrimonious politics in the UNSC 
between permanent Western members of the United States, the United Kingdom 
and France, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other hand. The clash of 
interests between the two opposing sides, where the unity and agreement of both 
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sides must exist before any collective and legitimate UN action can be taken in 
Syria, is what frustrates all efforts to end the civil war. Another account believes 
that the sectarianization of the civil war gives it a religious definition and has 
attracted terrorist and Jihadist activities. This has opened up old grievances and 
intensified inter-sectarian struggle, thus making the civil war protracted. Moreover, 
the adoption of the violent approach by the Syrian opposition as a resistant and 
offensive measure against the Syrian government’s brutality, rather than the non-
violent approach, has also been blamed for the cause of the prolonged war. The 
argument is that had the opposition maintained their initial non-violent approach 
against the brutality of the Syrian government, they would have worn global 
sympathy which would have caused a sustained global condemnation of the Bashar 
al-Assad government, discouraged the government’s allies and eventually occasion 
international intervention on their side with little efforts and objections.  
The crucial roles of foreign financial and material aids as well as Syria’s illicit 
economy in helping various Syrian opposition forces to keep fighting audaciously 
against the Syrian government is also thought to be responsible for prolonging the 
civil war. If the material and financial power of the Syrian opposition, in general, 
were weak, they would have been naturally forced to stop fighting and leave the 
Syrian government with no enemy to fight anymore. This would have ended the 
war.  
The reluctance and refusal of the West to use military action to oust the Syrian 
government is also thought to have prolonged the Syrian civil war and made it 
difficult to resolve now. The West’s refusal to use military action against the 
Syrian government in order to end the civil war is because Russia’s strong military 
presence in Syria in favour of the Syrian government poses a primary deterrence to 
it, while the difficult natural geographical barriers in Syria, the complicated nature 
of the civil war, anticipated humanitarian crisis of great amount, and domestic anti-
war atmosphere in the West also constitute a secondary deterrence to the block. It 
is also contended that the reason the civil war is protracted and difficult to end is 
because of internal factors such as the complex dynamics of the civil war itself, the 
awkward internal politics and the comparatively lopsided institutional power 
arrangement of the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition which create a 
situation in which the Syrian government appears to be winning the war but the 
opposition remains resilient, resourceful and difficult to defeat completely. The 
paper also argues that external factors are responsible for the protraction and 
intractability of the civil war. Consequently, the war continues beyond expectation 
and neither the Syrian government nor the Syrian opposition can easily claim a 
decisive and lasting military victory because external players, most especially the 
great powers of Russia and the United States, support opposing forces and have 
conflicting interests in the war for which they are unable to find a compromise. 
Until they reach a compromise, which is most unlikely, the civil war is certain to 
continue.  
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It is distilled from the theory-based arguments that Bashar al-Assad still remains in 
power in Syria despite strong local and international denunciation of him and all 
organised efforts to oust him, because of a wide range of factors including the 
following: 
(1) disorganized Syrian opposition, (2) wide Russian and Iranian pro-Syrian 
government activities, (3) Syrian government’s strong internal support base, (4) 
existence of some delegitimized and incompetent opposition groups, (5) ominous 
regional impact of Syria’s disintegration, (6) threat of Islamist terrorism, (7) failed 
international attempts at governmental change, (8) gloomy aftermath of NATO’s 
intervention in Libya and failure of democratic institutionalization post-Gaddafi, 
(9) UNSC’s discordant views of the Arab Spring, (10) lack of serious post-
intervention development plan for Syria, (11) suspicion of the expansion of 
Western imperialism via Responsibility to Protect, (12) external non-intervention 
sentiment in the US public, (13) Obama’s policy of narrowing US external military 
activities, (14) hopeless faith in the possibility of a UNSC-sanctioned intervention 
in Syria, (15) troubling realities in Syria and the Middle East, and (16) doubts of 
the genuineness of Russo-American partnership in resolving the Syrian conflict. 
These factors have the dual effects of making Bashar al-Assad to perpetuate 
himself in power and making the Syrian civil war to remain protracted and 
intractable.  
Although the theory-based arguments presented above are strong and revealing, the 
paper accepts the explanation based on the national role theory as the most 
compelling because it is the roles of external players, sometimes constructive and 
some other times destructive, in supporting various internal parties to the Syrian 
civil war as well as their pursuit of conflicting selfish interests, that have kept the 
war on-going. The obstructive activities of external players also cover the 
disharmonious activities of the five permanent members of the UNSC which have 
crippled the Council and the UN, in general, from acting to end the civil war in 
Syria. Had the UNSC acted neutrally and altruistically in Syria, the Syrian 
government and the Syrian opposition would have been forced to stop fighting a 
war that would have been short, ending in favour of either side. Reconciliation, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction would have started a long time ago. However, this 
is not the case. The civil war continues up to now not because the Syrian 
government and the Syrian rebel forces are masters of the art of war or because 
they have inexhaustible resources to prosecute the war for too long, but because 
external players seeking to exploit the war selfishly are fanning the embers of the 
war so that the war has become a tiring and lingering one. The Syrian government 
and the Syrian opposition keep fighting because they are being consistently 
propped up by their external backers who seem to be fighting the war by proxy and 
are unwilling to compel both sides to end the war, even when they can because 
they profit enormously from it. 
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